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Fukushima, Idaho

East Idaho Gamma Ray detector not functioning? Gamma levels higher than “typical”? Evidence of Fukushima Daiichi?

As the Japanese nuclear disaster continues on, with no end in sight, I discovered that a public radiation detector, or High Pressure Ion Chamber (HPIC)/gamma detector, in the middle of nowhere eastern Idaho, apparently is not working.

It’s part of the Idaho Environmental Monitoring Program (IEMP), which is actually run by a conglomeration of Federal and State agencies.  They include the State of Idaho, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

Big Lost River IEMP Tower

IEMP is located at the Big Lost River rest stop along U.S. 26/20 highway.  It’s sandwiched between the INL complex and EBR 1.  The area is home to at least 50 nuclear power projects, a sign at the rest stop claims it’s the most nuclear projects in one area in the whole world.

HPIC gamma detector. Note that it is made by GE, the same company behind Fukushima Daiichi.

At the rest stop there is also a display that presents current IEMP data to the public. However, the gamma radiation display is blank.  There is a website, www.idahoop.org.   The website is not put together well, but when I clicked on the Rest Area Tower (found under the Community Monitoring section) it does display the gamma levels.  As of 25 May 2012 background gamma radiation is at 16.1 μR/h (micro Roentgens per hour).

Big Lost River rest stop IEMP display board

This might be a little high, but how are we in the general public supposed to know?  Here’s a couple of examples: According to Wikipedia 9.8 μR/h equals approximately 86 mR/year, which is considered “less than typical”.  Another example is that of the ghost city of Pripyat, which was contaminated by Chernobyl in the 1980s.  As of 5 January 2012 the city was still showing gamma levels as high as 66 μR/h, which is why no one can live there!

The IEMP website also gives you locations of several other gamma stations throughout eastern Idaho. They surround the INL. Here’s what the many Towers were picking up on 25 May 2012: Blackfoot  10.4 μR/h, Idaho Falls 13.8 μR/h, Fort Hall reservation 14.5 μR/h, Rexburg 13.0 μR/h and Terreton 15.0 μR/h.

The major problem with this IEMP website is that it does not give you any historical gamma readings.  The system was put into place in 1997, and having that historical data would be the best way to see if gamma radiation was increasing or not.  We also don’t know if the current, slightly higher than “typical”, micro Roentgens per hour of gamma radiation is the result of the record number of nuclear projects in the area, or from Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi!

Big Lost River IEMP station

There are many EMP sites throughout the United States, such as CEMP in Nevada.  But not all monitor gamma radiation. The CIEMP checks only solar radiation (net radiation).  You can search under “environmental monitoring program” to see if any are in your area of the U.S.

Fukushima

One Year Later: Japanese lose faith in their government, more proof the UN reports are bogus!

“I can’t believe the government, I don’t believe the government! We have to protect ourselves, that’s what we’ve learned from Fukushima.”-Kubo Yuki, regularly tests her family’s store bought food for radiation

24 May 2012, CNN ran a short report chronicling the spread of radiation ever since the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster began.  CNN aired the report the same day the United Nations basically said the spread of radiation from Fukushima was not that bad.

“Never listen to what the government tells you, if you do you’ll pay!”-Yaegashi Ayako, lives with family in newly built apartment that is radioactive.

Yaegashi and her family want to leave, but government officials insist they are safe on the third floor.  It was local city officials who discovered that the foundation was radioactive. It was built with cement made from rock contaminated by fallout from Fukushima Daiichi.

As for Kubo Yuki, she shops for food at one of dozens of new small grocery stores that allow customers to check their food for radiation.

The CNN report is more proof that the UN reports are bogus!

Fukushima

One Year Later: UN radiation studies are Bogus! Did not conduct independent tests, used faulty & out of date data from Japanese government!

On 24 May 2012, two United Nations organizations released preliminary results of their so called studies of radiation exposure in Japan.  The problem is that those “studies” relied on government provided data, which even now TEPCo says are wrong.

First, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, or UNSCEAR, claimed that six workers at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant did not die from radiation.

UNSCEAR did say that eight workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation.  UNSCEAR will make a final report at the end of the year.

Second, the UN World Health Organization is reporting that Japan has not been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation! The UNWHO did say that radiation levels where dangerous near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, and that infants were susceptible to thyroid cancer.

Reason number 1 that the UN studies are bogus: Data was provided by the Japanese government, which from day one of the nuclear disasters has proven to be either grossly incompetent, or a bunch of blatant liars. The United Nations organizations did not conduct any of their own testing!  Independent radiation testing, by individuals, local governments and even local businesses have revealed higher radiation levels than what the government of Japan is reporting.

A Reuters report pointed out that the UN studies “…did not deal with radiation exposure suffered by emergency workers or people closest to the disaster site.” and that “The experts based their assessment on data available up to last September…”  In other words the faulty government data they used wasn’t even up to date!

Reason number 2 that the UN studies are bogus: On the same day the United Nations was trying to calm everyone’s concerns over the ongoing nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCo) made a startling revelation; 900,000 terabecquerels of radioactive iodine-131 and cesium-137 have spewed from Reactor 1 and Reactor 3, since the end of March 2011!  That’s as much as 80% higher than official Japanese government data!

When you compare the Fukushima Daiichi cesium-137 levels to Chernobyl, it’s four times higher!

 

Fukushima

One Year later: TEPCo Fukushima Daiichi radiation level Press Release 24 May 2012

Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on 11 March 2011, TEPCo’s facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.

With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on 17 April 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on 19 July  we accomplished the Step1 target “Radiation dose is in steady decline”. Then on 16 December we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target “Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down”. In addition, on 21 December 2011, we have compiled the “Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO”, for which we’re currently working towards.

Along with the roadmaps mentioned above, we have been evaluating the amount of radioactive materials released into the air and the ocean as a result of the accident. The evaluation result (as of May 2012) is provided below.

As for the amount of radioactive materials released into the air, the evaluation was done from March 12 to 31, 2011. The estimated release amounts are as follows.
Noble gas: Approx. 5×1017 Bq
Iodine 131: Approx. 5×1017 Bq
Cesium 134: Approx. 1×1016 Bq
Cesium 137: Approx. 1×1016 Bq

The amounts of radioactive materials released in April and later in 2011 are not taken into account in this evaluation result as the released amounts were less than 1% of that in March 2011, which are considered to be insignificant.

As for the amount of radioactive materials released into the ocean, the evaluation was done from March 26 to September 30, 2011. The estimated release amounts are as follows.
Iodine 131: Approx. 1.1×1016 Bq
Cesium 134: Approx. 3.5×1015 Bq
Cesium 137: Approx. 3.6×1015 Bq

As the equipments to directly measure the density of radioactive materials (such as the exhaust stack monitor) were unavailable due to the accident, the amount of radioactive materials released into the air was estimated by entering the measurement data (air dose rate, wind direction and wind speed) acquired by the monitoring cars in the power station and the observed values provided by the Japan Meteorological Agency into a program which calculates the amount of radioactive materials diffused into the air, with an assumption that the release rate of radioactive nuclides remains consistent. The evaluation result was then compared with the contamination density measurement result of soil provided by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and our evaluation result has been validated.

However, further data still needs to be collected to review the validity of our evaluation result, considering that the data was acquired only in a limited area (in the power station site) and that the evaluation was done under the assumption that the release rate of radioactive nuclides is consistent though it should actually vary for each nuclide and depending on the status of reactors (the release rate was estimated based solely on the small amount of data obtained during the evaluation period).

The amount of radioactive materials released into the ocean was estimated based on the monitoring data of radioactivity density of materials included in the seawater near the north/south water discharge channels at the power station. The evaluation was done at the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry by utilizing a program which calculates the diffusion of radioactive materials into the ocean.

However, further data still needs to be collected to review the validity of our evaluation result, considering that the evaluation was done based on a small amount of data acquired in a limited area (monitoring data of radioactivity density of materials included in the seawater near the north/south water discharge channels at the power station), and that individual evaluation was not done for each release factor (radioactive materials directly released from the power station, fallouts from the air, rainwater inflow, etc.).

We will continue our utmost efforts in maintaining the stable condition of our nuclear power stations and implementing the measures to decommission Units 1-4.

< Attachment >
–Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air as a Result of the Accident Occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (PDF 115KB)
–Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Ocean (Near the Port) (PDF 88.2KB)

< Reference >
–Methods Used to Estimate the Radioactive Materials Released into the Air [Outline] (PDF 240KB)
–Estimation Result of the Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Ocean (Near the Port) (PDF 334KB)
–Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air as a Result of the Accident Occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station [Report] (PDF 4.30MB)

English version of “Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air as a Result of the Accident Occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” , “Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Ocean (Near the Port)” , “Methods Used to Estimate the Radioactive Materials Released into the Air [Outline]” , “Estimation Result of the Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Ocean (Near the Port)” is now being developed.
We will post the translated material one by one when it is prepared.

The attached file titled “Estimated Amount of Radioactive Materials Released into the Air as a Result of the Accident Occurred at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station [Report]” is only available in Japanese.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.

Fukushima

One Year Later: Cops suffering PTSD after responding to tsunami & nuclear disasters!

24 May 2012, Japan’s National Police Agency reports that their own study finds that at least 4% of police who responded to the disasters that began on 11 March  2011, are showing signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

The study followed cops in the three hardest hit prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. The study also broke down results according to workload, and proximity to the ongoing nuclear disaster reactors at Fukushima Daiichi.

At least 10% of police officers, who’ve had an increase in workload since 11 March 2011, are showing more signs of PTSD.  At least 7% of cops working near the GE designed reactors have signs of PTSD.

People working as police in the disaster areas are not only having to enforce laws and protect property, but they too are dealing with the disaster as victims as well.

The National Police Agency (NPA) says no cop has been officially/medically diagnosed with PTSD (’cause it could end their careers), but the NPA says it will work to create policies for coping with PTSD symptoms.

 

Fukushima

One Year later: Confirmed; nuclear reactor containment vessels breached, radioactive material pouring out!

23 May 2012, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization has confirmed that two reactor containment vessels at the GE designed Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, are breached and leaking radioactive materials.

Back in March Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCo) assumed that one containment vessel was cracked, because they found that after months of injecting tons of cooling water there was only 60 centimeters (23 inches) of water in Reactor 2! They were hoping for 2 meters (6.5 feet) of water!

Now the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization says Reactor 2’s water level is actually 40 centimeters (15.7 inches)!  They also say that data shows that Reactor 1 containment vessel is breached as well!

TEPCo’s decommissioning plan requires the reactors to be filled with water, to help reduce radiation levels to the point that the partially melted fuel rods can be removed. This can not be done if the containment vessels are breached.  Like I, and many others have said, why don’t they pour sand, lead, boric acid and concrete on it?!?

 

Fukushima

One Year Later: Government literally ignoring calls for help from tsunami & radiation refugees!

23 May 2012.  Back in March local level governments in Japan set up a help hotline for refugees from Iwate, Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures.  Supposedly this was to insure that refugees were able to be heard by local government officials.

So far only about 10% of those who call are getting through. Out of the 370,000 calls made to the hotline, only 40,000 were answered!

The hotline is called Yorisoi, which operate 38 call centers in Japan.  Their northeastern boss blames the lack of answered calls on lack of reconstruction in the disaster hit areas, and on refugees making calls at night (even thought it is a 24 hour call center).

Yorisoi officials claim they can not find enough employees to take calls at night!

 

International, U.S.

World War 3: Afghan Parliament rejecting U.S. military pact. U.S. bribing Afghan politicians with promises of Green Cards.

23 May 2012, two parliamentary committees have rejected the military pact signed in a midnight meeting between Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and U.S. President Barack Obama.

One of those committees is the Judicial Committee, which ruled that the military pact violates the national interests of Afghans.  The pact must be approved by the Afghan parliament.

Qorban-Ali Erfani, a member of the National Assembly of Afghanistan (parliament), said officials from Karzai’s administration, and the United States government, are busy trying to bribe politicians into approving the Strategic Partnership Agreement.

The bribes include money and promises of paperwork allowing them to immigrate to the United States (Green Cards).

Erfani also said that U.S. statements about the Afghan police and army being ready to take over are all propaganda. He claims that in the past 11 years nothing has been done to make Afghan security forces truly self-sufficient.

 

International, U.S.

World War 3: General Allen issues statement proving that U.S. will be “in Region” for long time to come

The following is ISAF commander, U.S. General John R. Allen’s 21 May 2012 statement following the NATO/Afghanistan summit in Chicago. It shows that not only will the U.S. stay in Afghanistan, but considers the whole region vital to U.S. national interest.

I am grateful for the overwhelming commitment from the international community to support Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond. I was proud to join in the NATO Summit in Chicago that sent three unmistakable messages to the world:

• To the Afghan people: we are committed to your future,
• To the Region: the international community will not abandon Afghanistan; and
• To the Taliban: you cannot wait us out.

Among the important outcomes of this event was the resounding commitment by the ISAF partner nations for the long term support of an Afghan National Security Force that is sufficient, capable, and sustainable in the post-2014 period.

This historic summit took place at a time of considerable operational progress in our shared campaign. Because of the extraordinary courage and skill of our ISAF coalition partners, and the Afghan National Security Force’s fighting men and women, this spring and summer, the insurgents have come back to find that many of their caches are empty; their former strongholds are untenable; and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwilling to join the fight. And, most importantly, insurgents are facing a battle-tested and increasingly capable Afghan National Security Force that is also serving as a source of pride to the Afghan people and a symbol of unity for this country.

During the last 12 months, the Afghan security forces have expanded from 276,000 to 340,000. They will reach their full surge strength ahead of the scheduled deadline in October. Additionally, Afghan forces are increasingly in the lead throughout the battle space, and the Afghans were in the lead for planning of this year’s campaign plan, Operation Naweed.

The expansion and professionalization of Afghan security forces now allow us to recover the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge troops by this fall, enable us to continue to pressure the Taliban to reintegrate and reconcile, and make possible security transition to the Afghans in accordance with our Lisbon commitments – and on time.

President Karzai’s historic announcement of Tranche 3 of the transition process is a significant milestone in our progress. The coming transition of every provincial capital and the Afghan National Security Forces providing security lead for three-quarters of the population marks the ever-increasing authority and capability of the Government of Afghanistan.

This summit, with its unambiguous commitment of long term support for the security of Afghanistan, is the clearest message yet the Taliban and the enemies of the Afghan people will not win this war. The Afghan National Security Forces, with the unwavering support and tangible commitments of the 50-nation coalition, grow stronger every day. Additionally, the Summit was a powerful signal of international support for an Afghan-led process of reconciliation; and in this process resides the greatest hope for the Taliban for the future. In the wake of this historic NATO Summit, as the Taliban see that their time grows short, they can choose to be part of the prosperous future of Afghanistan, but they can never prevail through violence and intimidation.

This campaign has been long, it has been difficult, and it has been costly. But I believe that ISAF’s campaign is on track. I see it every day – tangible evidence of progress. We are making a difference. We are fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap of Transition, and the international community is standing with the noble Afghan people and Afghanistan now and into the Decade of Transformation. 

International, U.S.

World War 3: U.S./NATO/ISAF Chicago declaration on Afghanistan; “task is not yet complete”

Preamble

  1. We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan. In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit, ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.
  2. In the ten years of our partnership the lives of Afghan men, women and children, have improved significantly in terms of security, education, health care, economic opportunity and the assurance of rights and freedoms. There is more to be done, but we are resolved to work together to preserve the substantial progress we have made during the past decade. The nations contributing to ISAF will therefore continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance in security, improved governance, and economic and social development. This will prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. A secure and stable Afghanistan will make an important contribution to its region, in which security, stability and development are interlinked.
  3. ISAF nations and Afghanistan join in honoring all those – civilian or military, Afghan or foreign – who have lost their lives or been injured in the fight for our common security and a prosperous, peaceful and stable Afghanistan. We pay particular tribute to the courage of the armed forces of Afghanistan and ISAF countries who live, train and fight next to each other every day. We are determined that all our sacrifices will be justified by our strong long-term partnership, which will contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

General principles

  1. Our efforts are part of the broader engagement of the International Community as outlined by the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation which was launched in November 2011 and the Bonn Conference in December 2011.
  2. We recall the firm mutual commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011, which form the basis of our long-term partnership. In this context, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan confirms its resolve to deliver on its commitment to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected. The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. Their   transparency, exclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. In this context, continued progress towards these goals will encourage ISAF nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.
  3. We emphasize the importance of full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights. We remain committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security. We recognize also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict as required in relevant UNSCRs.

Fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap and building the Enduring Partnership

  1. In Lisbon, in November 2010, we decided on the phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security. NATO/ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remain committed to this transition strategy which began in July 2011. Irreversible transition is on track and will be completed by the end of 2014. We also recognize in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development.
  2. The third wave of provinces to enter the transition process was announced by President Karzai on 13 May 2012. This means that 75% of Afghanistan’s population will soon be living in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, all parts of Afghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be in the lead for security nation-wide. This will mark an important milestone in the Lisbon roadmap. ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014.
  3. The success of transition has been enabled by the substantial improvement of the ANSF since Lisbon in terms of capability and professionalism. Afghan soldiers are increasingly taking the lead in operations on Afghan soil. Afghan forces, both army and police, have proven able to maintain security in those areas which have  already entered into transition.
  4. The completion of transition, however, will not mean the end of the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s stability and development. Afghanistan and NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all its dimensions, up to 2014 and beyond, including through joint programs to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. In this context, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will now deepen their consultations towards shaping the Enduring Partnership.
  5. Meanwhile, we welcome the fact that a number of ISAF countries have concluded, or are in the process of concluding, bilateral partnership agreements with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These bilateral partnership frameworks will form the basis of cooperation and friendship between an independent, sovereign and democratic Afghanistan and those countries on the basis of equality and mutual interest.

Beyond 2014

  1. In order to safeguard and build on the substantial progress and shared achievement, ISAF nations reaffirm their enduring commitment to Afghan security beyond 2014; the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to welcome that support.
  2. ISAF, including the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, has played a key role in taking the ANSF to the levels they have now reached. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms that NATO has a crucial part to play, with partners and alongside other actors, in training, advising and assisting the ANSF and invites NATO to continue its support. As transition of security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission.
  3. We agree to work towards establishing such a new NATO-led mission. We will ensure that the new mission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

Sustaining the ANSF

  1. With the support of ISAF nations, Afghanistan is committed to developing an ANSF which is governed by the Constitution and is capable of providing security to all Afghans. It will operate under effective civilian leadership, in accordance with the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
  2. At the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn on 5 December 2011, the wider International Community decided to support the training, equipping, financing and capability development of the ANSF beyond the end of the transition period. NATO Allies and ISAF partners reaffirm their strong commitment to this process and will play their part in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We also call on the International Community to commit to this long-term sustainment. The pace and the size of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in consultation with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US$4.1billion, and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.
  3. Sustaining a sufficient and capable ANSF is the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by the International Community. As part of the wider International Community, and building upon existing mechanisms, we will play our part in developing appropriate, coherent and effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF.   Such mechanisms will be flexible, transparent, accountable, cost-effective and will include measures against corruption. They will also distinguish between funding for the army and the police as well as for further capacity development within the relevant Afghan ministries and security institutions.
  4. As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least US$500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In the light of this, during the Transformation Decade, we expect international donors will reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan government of increasing financial responsibility.
  5. As the Afghan National Police further develop and professionalize, they will evolve towards a sustainable, credible, and accountable civilian law enforcement force that will shoulder the main responsibility for domestic security. This force should be capable of providing policing services to the Afghan population as part of the broader Afghan rule of law system. This will require an adequate plan to be developed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, supported as appropriate by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) or its successor. Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will play a crucial role in ensuring security and stability, and in supporting legitimate governance and sustainable economic growth across the country.

Towards a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan

  1. A political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration is key to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. In this context, we reiterate the importance of the principles decided at the Bonn Conference. These are that the process leading to reconciliation must be truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and must be inclusive and representative of the legitimate interests of all Afghan people, regardless of gender or status. Reconciliation must also contain the reaffirmation of a sovereign, stable and united Afghanistan, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism, and compliance with the Afghan Constitution, including its human rights provisions, especially on the rights of women.
  2. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will positively contribute to economic and social development in the wider region, and deliver progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime. In this context, regional cooperation and support for stability in Afghanistan is key. There are two important events on the way to securing the future commitment of key regional and international partners. The upcoming Kabul Ministerial Conference on the Istanbul Process will launch an initial set of regional confidence-building measures while at the Tokyo Conference the International Community and Afghan leadership will discuss a framework for future development assistance.
  3. Our task is not yet complete. But in the light of our substantial achievements, and building on our firm and shared commitment, we are confident that our strong partnership will lead Afghanistan towards a better future.